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ONLINE NEWS AND THE EFFECTS OF HEURISTIC CUES
ON AUDIENCES' ATTITUDES

HOCHEOL YANG

ABSTRACT
This paper is designed to explore how online readers process information when
online news articles have majority cues. These majority cues are conceptualized as a
specific type of heuristic cue and this study discovered complex interaction effects of this
heuristic cue. Heuristic and Systematic Model (HSM) and Elaboration Likelihood Model
(ELM) successfully predict how these interaction effects work when these models work
together. MANOVA and ANOVA analyses report significant interaction effects among
heuristic cues, involvement, and argument quality on readers attitudes (attitude toward
information and author’s credibility) that supporting both Hypothesis 1 and 2.
Specifically, in regard a Hypothesis 1, when argument quality is strong the
heuristic cue increases the attitude toward information and author’s credibility more
positively when the information is about a low-involvement product. On the other hand,
the heuristic cue decreases attitude toward information and author’s credibility more
negatively when the information is about a high-involvement product. Regarding a
Hypothesis 2, when the heuristic cue is low, the strong argument quality increases the
attitude toward information and author’s credibility more positively when the information
iv

is about a high-involvement product. On the other hand, the strong argument quality
decreases the attitude toward information and author’s credibility more negatively when
the information is about a low-involvement product.
In summary, the explanations of both HSM and ELM are supported only when
people use their cognitive resources efficiently. On the other hand, theories of
Maximization of Cognitive Efficiency (MCE) and affordances explain when people need
to use cognitive resources inefficiently. That is because humans are naturally moderate
their information processing in the dynamic manner that maximizes their cognitive
efficiency to interpret the given information and environment efficiently and in a timely
manner. Therefore, at first, people start to adopt heuristic cues to reduce cognitive load
even when they are highly involved in subjects. Next, people start to ignore heuristic cues
when they are not involved in subjects. Additionally, this study further suggests that
people can also ignore heuristic cues when they are highly involved in subjects and when
they have to spend cognitive resources far exceeding their threshold.
It is good to know that people have a mechanism that maximizes their limited
cognitive resources, because this will help to make better communication strategies for
online-communicators. On the other hand, we need to be careful when we express our
interests. This is the time that we have to carefully select what we will click.

v
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Most online news pages have features such as “number of recommends,”
“positive feedbacks,” “cited,” “likes,” “comments,” and “shares.” These are
summarized statistics of readers’ online behaviors that are common across the Internet on
nearly all news sites. Figure 1 displays examples of these features. These are features that
make online news information different when compared to traditional printed newspapers
and magazines, and these features may have influences on online readers’ information
processing, among other cognitive and behavioral effects.

Figure 1.
Example of “like,” “tweet,” “google+1,” “buffer,” and “share” on an online news
page

As online news readers see high numbers associated with these features (e.g.,
several hundred comments on an article, or a story that has been shared on Facebook 500
times), these features may then draw readers’ attention and may influence their attitudes
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and behaviors. Even though these features have the potential to affect online news
readers, they are separate from the content and meaning of the news articles associated
with them. The problem is that there are not many known effects of these prevalent
online news features, especially when they indicate high numbers. This study will
examine the effects of these online news features.
The first step of this study is trying to conceptualize these features (e.g., “number
of recommends,” “positive feedbacks,” “cited,” “likes,” “comments,” and “shares”)
when these features indicate a high number of readers who are using them. This paper
will then apply theories of interactivity (Massey & Levy, 1999; Sundar & Nass, 2001)
and heuristic processing (Chaiken, 1980; Faraji-Rad, Samuelsen, & Warlop, 2012; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1979). Next, this study will use the Heuristic and Systematic Model (HSM)
(Chaiken, 1980; Faraji-Rad et al., 2012; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) and the Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM) (Chaiken, 1980; Faraji-Rad et al., 2012; Thurman, 2008) to
understand these online features. Finally, I will test my hypotheses and draw conclusions
about these online news features.
Even though online news offers immediacy, content richness, user control (Bucy,
2004; Sundar & Nass, 2001), and abundant sources for readers, readers do not always
have enough time and attention to read online news stories in their entirety. Instead, many
people want to focus only on what they are interested in and can read quickly and easily.
That is one of the reasons why online news readers rely on simplified information to form
their attitudes (Faraji-Rad et al., 2012). Therefore, while “number of recommends,”
“positive feedbacks,” “cited,” “likes,” “comments,” and “shares” are interactive features,
when they indicate certain high numbers they may then have much different influences
2

than when they have low numbers. In particular, these high numbers (e.g., more than
4000 comments for a Plain Dealer story on the Cleveland Browns) may create heuristic
cues that may help readers to process information more efficiently, and it may impact
readers’ attitudes.
Beyond interactivity, HSM (Chaiken, 1980; Faraji-Rad et al., 2012; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979) can shed light on this question because studies in this area have tried to
explain why people process messages in different ways. Heuristic processing incorporates
less cognitive efforts and capacity by using the available subset of information instead of
the systematic process (Chaiken & Eagly, 1989). Similarly, these interactive online news
features create certain information that reflects complex interactions among online news
readers in a simplified version, which could also be conceptualized as a heuristic cue.
Furthermore, when interactive features indicate high numbers they have two
dimensions of a heuristic cue. One dimension of a heuristic cue implies that a sheer
number of people agree with and favor the information of an online news story, such as a
high number of “positive feedbacks,” “cited,” and “likes.” The other dimension of a
heuristic cue implies a sheer number of people interested in the online news story because
of high numbers of “number of comments” and “shares.” This paper focuses on the
effects of the first dimension of heuristic cues which implies that a sheer number of
people agree with the content of the news article, its arguments, or the writer’s
perspective. This type of heuristic cue is called a majority cue. A majority cue can be
defined as a type of heuristic cue that online information has when related interactive
features (i.e., “number of recommends,” “positive feedbacks,” “cited,” “likes”) indicate
very high numbers.
3

Regarding the effects of these heuristic cues, the HSM predicts that low
involvement would increase the persuasive effects of different heuristic cues and would
lower the persuasive effects of a strong argument (Chaiken, 1980; Faraji-Rad et al., 2012;
Thurman, 2008). On the other hand, ELM HSM predicts high involvement would lower
the persuasive effects of the heuristic cue and would increase the persuasive effects of
strong argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). This study will examine these relationships
and determine whether they can be applied to online news articles that have majority
cues.
This paper is concerned with how online readers process information. The results
of this paper will contribute to a better understanding of people who participate in online
communication processes; people who design online communication platforms, such as
news and contents providers; people who are concerned about the credibility of online
information; and people who routinely use online news communication.

4

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Chaiken (1980) and Petty and Cacioppo (1979) offered explanations of why
people process messages in different ways. HSM (Chaiken, 1980) emphasised the effects
of noncontents cues when people process in a peripheral way. On the other hand, ELM
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) emphasised the effects of content quality when people process
in a central way. This chapter will provide different aspects of message processing from
HSM and ELM, and explore how they explain the effects of majority cues on attitudes
toward online news.

Heuristic and Systematic Model

According to the heuristic versus systematic perspective, audiences incorporate
comparatively small amounts of effort and rely on accessible information to minimize the
cognitive effort in judging message validity (Chaiken, 1980). Simon (1956) argued that
this is because humans have bounded rationality due to their limited cognitive capacity.
By using heuristics, humans ignore part of the available information. This leads to a
5

better decision when the conditions are complex (Gigerenzer, 2010), and it also helps
them to reduce uncertainties (Gigerenzer, 2008). However, HSM argues that this is
because humans are cognitive misers, and people tend to use cognitive resources only
when they are motivated (Chaiken, 1980).
The role of motivation is very similar with the role of involvement in the
Elaboration Likability Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). The difference between HSM
and ELM is that HSM focuses on what happens when people are in a low motivation,
while ELM focuses on what happens when people are in a high involvement.
Additionally, HSM has one more element than ELM. HSM argues that cognitive ability
also plays an important role like motivation (Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2011). When
people have low motivation or low cognitive ability to process messages, heuristic
processing manages to focus on easily understood cues such as an audience reaction. This
heuristic processing relies on quick and efficient cognitive short cuts (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) consciously or unconsciously to reduce the use of cognitive resources
(Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2011). Therefore, HSM describes the roles of motivation that
change individuals’ cognitive processes.
There are many examples that heuristic cues enhance the persuasiveness of
messages. Chaiken (1980) found that systematic processing enhances the persuasive
influence of message cues and reduces the persuasive influence of noncontent cues;
however, heuristic processing reduces the persuasive influence of message cues and
enhances the persuasive influence of noncontents cues. Similary, a study by Faraji-Rad et
al. (2012) found that the similarity effects of the persuasiveness of class advisors were
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enhanced when people had limited cognitive resources and incorporated “feels right”
experience to their judgment (Faraji-Rad et al., 2012).
Chaiken (1980) also tested systematic versus heuristic processes using the effects
of likable and unlikable communicators in both high and low involvement. The result of
this experiment showed that the low involvement individuals significantly changed their
opinions when a likable communicator presented the issue (Chaiken, 1980). In addition,
their follow up experiment confirmed the different effects of likable and unlikable
communicators in both high and low involvement (Chaiken, 1980).
Edwards and Edwards (2013) similarly tested the idea that positive computer
mediated ratings induced participants to perceive their classes’ instructor as more
credible, and resulted in more effective learning and motivation to learn than negative or
mixed ratings.
These different examples support the effects of heuristic cues in changing
attitudes when people are in low involvement and motivation; however, they did not
focus on why heuristic cues had no effects when people are in high involvement and
motivation.
Therefore, this study will try to answer what is the relationship between
involvement and different message processes, how persuasion research needs to explore
the conditions to determine how people process persuasive messages, what the processing
mechanisms are, and when people incorporate heuristic cues or not.

7

Elaboration likelihood model (ELM)

Unlike HSM, ELM offers an explanation concerning the effects of involvement
that shows how involvement influences the persuasiveness of a message; in other words,
increased involvement with a message is associated with more information processing
and elaboration than reduced involvement (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). ELM explains
when we should be particularly likely to process a message, more or less, about
persuasive information (Perloff, 2012).
Using central and peripheral path processing, ELM describes a comprehensive
structure to understand persuasion (Perloff, 2012). Increased involvement and ability are
likely to lead to the central process, as well as leading to the elaborated process (Perloff,
2012; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). On the other hand, reduced involvement ability likely
leads to peripheral process and heuristic process (Chaiken, 1980; Perloff, 2012). The
difference of involvement might be due to personal importance or immediate reward
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). ELM could be applied to most persuasive messages including
posts, news, and messages on the internet. Although, online news and newspapers are
similar to other in regard to dealing with similar news content and influencing each other
positively and negatively at the same time (Van der Wurff, 2005), online news and
newspapers have different aspects such as interactive features. In addition, there are only
a few empirical research studies about investigating ELM in this context except for some
online news credibility studies (Eysenbach, 2008; Freeman & Spyridakis, 2004; Jo,
2005).
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Petty and Cacioppo (1979) tested the effects of argument quality on persuasion.
They manipulated involvement between high and low involvement, and argument quality
between a strong argument, which provided statistical data and supporting studies, and a
weak argument, which provided only quotations and opinions. After that, they observed
the change of attitude and cognitive responses (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Their
experiment supported the Hypothesis that involvement would increase the persuasive
effects of a strong argument and would decrease the persuasive effects of a weak
argument (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Their study suggested that increased involvement
enhanced the importance of the message and enhanced the elaborated process.

The effects of heuristic cues and argument quality on online news

There are differences between reading online news and reading a newspaper.
First, online news pages have interactive features such as immediacy, content richness,
and user control (Bucy, 2004). Online news embeds hyperlinks, user comments, sharing,
and a rating system. These features enable readers to participate in the storytelling of
news when readers are interested in news that they read. Second, there is complex choice
of news content (Massey & Levy, 1999), and therefore readers are likely to pursue their
own interests (Tewksbury, 2003). Readers easily jump to abundant alternative news
sources and issues when they are not interested in the news that they read. Increased
interactivity and abundant information sources enable readers to express their opinions
and to take part in a story, which they are interested in, and it changes the relationship
between journalists and readers (Thurman, 2008).
9

Interactivity of internet news offers additional heuristic cues that a newspaper
does not have. Majority cue is one kind of these heuristic cues that online news pages
offer. Most of the online news pages have a feature that shows the number of
recommendations, shares, likes, comments, and citations. These majority cues imply that
a certain number of people who read the article agreed with the argument and were
motivated to leave their positive response. Figure 2 shows example of the majority cue on
a YouTube video. However, there is no way to find out what kinds of people left their
feedback and how many did not leave any feedback on the article.

Figure 2.
An example of the majority cue on a YouTube (in a square with dashed line)
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The effects of heuristic cues and argument quality on online news

Heuristic cues are more persuasive and “feels right” (Faraji-Rad et al., 2012)
when people are in low involvement, but less persuasive when people are in high
involvement. Specifically, heuristic cues, such as communicator likability (Chaiken,
1980) and salience of a communicator’s attractiveness (Pallak, 1983), change the attitude
about persuasive messages more positively under low involvement conditions than high
involvement conditions. That is because, when people are less involved in the given
information, they are more likely to handle the information with low elaboration and
peripheral process.
On the other hand, ELM predicts that low involvement would increase the
persuasive effects of heuristic cues, and high involvement would decrease the persuasive
effects of heuristic cues. Figure 1 displays the relationship among heuristic cues,
involvement and attitude. To test that heuristic cues change the readers’ attitude about a
persuasive message, Hypothesis 1.a and 1.b will be tested, and Figure 3 displays the
relationship among heuristic cue, involvement, and attitude.

H1.a: The heuristic cue effect is stronger for a low-involvement product
compared to a high-involvement product.
H1.b: When the heuristic cue effect is high, the positive attitude about the
message will also be high.

11

Heuristic cue

1.a

Attitude

1.b

Involvement

Figure 3.
Research model of Hypothesis 1.a and 1.b

The effects of argument quality on online news

Contrary to the heuristic cue, high quality of content and argument is more
persuasive when people are in high involvement conditions, than in low involvement
conditions (Perloff, 2012). Specifically, a strong argument changes readers’ attitudes
about persuasive messages more positively under high involvement conditions than under
low involvement conditions (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979), because when people are highly
involved in a given information, they are likely to handle the information with high
elaboration and central processing (Perloff, 2012). To test the argument quality that
changes the readers’ attitudes about a persuasive message, Hypothesis 2.a and 2.b will be
tested. Figure 4 displays the relationship among heuristic cue, involvement, and attitude.
Additionally, Figure 5 displays a total conceptual model of this study that includes both
Hypothesis 1 and 2.

12

H2.a: The argument quality effect is stronger for a high-involvement
product compared to a low-involvement product.
H2.b: When the argument quality effect is high, the positive attitude about
the message will also be high.
2.a

Argument quality

Attitude

2.b

Involvement

Figure 4.
Research model of Hypothesis 2.a and 2.b

Argument quality
Attitude

Heuristic cue

Involvement

Figure 5.
Research model of Hypothesis 1 and 2
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CHAPTER III
METHOD

Participants

Participants of this study were 260 college students enrolled at Cleveland State
University. All participants were given the opportunity to participate in this study by
receiving extra credit in their classes. All participants agreed to an IRB approved consent
form in order to participate in the experiment. Among those participants, 27 participants
were excluded because they spent less than 5 minutes or more than 50 minutes to
complete the experimental session. Therefore, this study included a total of 232
participants, and each spent an average of 11.37 (SD = 5.31) minutes in their participation.
There were 106 males (45.7%) and 126 females (54.3%), and their average age was 23.5
(SD = 8.4). Among them, 33 (14.2%) participants were freshmen, 62 (26.7%) participants
were sophomores, 72 (31%) participants were juniors, 55 (23.7%) were seniors, and 9
(3.9%) participants were graduate students.
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Procedure

To test the effects of heuristic cue and argument quality, this study designed a 2
(high or low heuristic cue) × 2 (strong or weak argument) × 2 (high or low involvement)
factorial experiment. All participants were randomly assigned to one of 8 experimental
conditions by an online server’s software. Each conditions’ average number of
participants was 29 (SD = 5). Table 1 shows the number of assigned participants for each
condition.

Table 1.
Number of assigned participants for each condition

Argument Quality

Heuristic cue
Strong

Weak

Low involvement
Low

28

23

High

29

33

High involvement
Low

24

28

High

37

30

Finally, for a manipulation check, subjects were asked to answer the questions
about the involvement of the given stimulus topic at the end of the experiment.
15

Involvement (high or low involvement) manipulation

Involvement1 in the experiment was manipulated between high involvement and
low involvement. Based on involvement manipulation from Wu, Crocker, and Rogers
(1989), this study pretested a high involvement topic about athletic shoes and a low
involvement topic about facial tissue. Wu et al. (1989) asked about purchase history,
purchase and brand choice criteria, and level of involvement for 12 products to 48
students taking business classes. According to their survey results, they found out that
lowest involvement product was facial tissues, and highest involvement product was
athletic shoes among 12 products (Wu et al., 1989).
This is an example of the experimental stimulus for a high involvement, strong
argument, and high heuristic cue: If you want to run well and run safely, consider fit first
and price last. “You want a shoe that helps you maintain a balanced position, and a more
expensive shoe is not always the solution.” Money often buys higher-quality goods, but
not when it comes to running shoes, athletic equipment experts say. Some researchers
found that some low-and mid-cost shoes cushioned runners' feet just as well as high-cost
ones, sometimes even better.
Sales of running shoes reached a record $2.36 billion in 2013, 60 percent more
than a decade earlier. But some of those dollars may not have been well spent. In 2012,
Scottish researchers tested running shoes at three price levels, ranging from $80 to $150,

1

The text of the articles used in this experiment were originally used by a researcher (Wu, Crocker, and

Rogers, 1989), based on actual online news articles.
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and found that low- and mid-cost shoes within the same brand cushioned runners’ feet
just as well as high-cost ones, sometimes even better
This is an example of the experimental stimulus for a low involvement, strong
argument, and high heuristic cue: Now Kleenex has something it claims is a first: Along
with lotion, Kleenex Cool Touch contains ingredients that promise cooling relief to sore
noses.
In 2012, research indicates that softness is the most important quality for 84
percent of facial tissue purchasers, but facial tissue companies still pursue other
innovations to stand out. Kleenex Cool Touch, in contrast, is unscented; because, among
households that use facial tissue, 89 percent buy unscented varieties, while only 19
percent buy scented varieties, according to Mintel, a market research firm.

“This really is a game-changing innovation,” said Craig Smith, the brand
director for Kleenex. According to a recent research, for 91% of subjects were reported
that this is the tissue that releases a cool sensation, and it takes soothing to a whole
different level.
Facial tissues are used in 70 percent of households, according to Mintel, and Mr.
Smith, of Kleenex, believes that Cool Touch is an innovation that will draw consumers
from other brands and also win over some who thought toilet tissue or paper napkins
suited their noses fine.
This study tested participants’ involvement about each topic between athletic
shoes (Chronbach’s alpha of .54) and facial tissues (Chronbach’s alpha of .45) to pre-test
a manipulation (Guimond, 1997; Hunt, Keaveney, & Lee, 1995) with the below items,
17

and confirmed [F (1, 57) = 11.72, p ≤ .01] that participants are more involved in athletic
shoes (M = 6.57, SD = 1.60) than facial tissues (M = 5.50, SD = 1.61).
1) Athletic shoes / facial tissues is very important to me
2) About athletic shoes / facial tissues, it’s not a big deal if you make a
mistake :Reverse coded
3) About athletic shoes / facial tissues, it’s hard to make a bad choice :Reverse
coded
4) You can really tell about the quality of athletic shoes / facial tissues.
5) When purchasing athletic shoes / facial tissues., how important is the brand or
company?

Additionally, this study tested subjects’ involvement about each topic between
athletic shoes and facial tissues to test a manipulation check (Guimond, 1997; Hunt et al.,
1995) with the below items; however, these were not found to be a credible measure to
test participants involvement (Chronbach’s alpha of .09).
6) The article’s information is very important to me
7) About the information of the article, it’s not a big deal if you make a mistake
(reverse coded)
8) About the information of the article, it’s hard to make a bad choice (reverse
coded)
9) You can really tell about the quality of the product, which is discussed in the
article.
10) When purchasing the product that discussed in this article, how important is
the brand or company?

18

Heuristic cue (high or low cue) manipulation

The heuristic cue was manipulated between the conditions high or low cue.
Heuristic cues were printed at the margins of articles. The high heuristic cue was visually
shown: 6.2K people “recommended” an article2 and user rating of an article is 7,043,994
points, including 7,980,870 positive points and 936,876 negative points3. Regarding a
low cue condition, the cue was visually shown: 1 person “recommended” an article and
user rating of an article is -69 points, including 7 positive points and 76 negative points.
Figure 6 displays examples of high and low heuristic cues.

Low heuristic cue

High heuristic cue

Figure 6.
Manipulation between high and low heuristic cues

2

This is similar to the “like” found on Facebook.

These “points” are similar with a rating system that is very common in the Korean news site
Ohmynews.co.kr.
3
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Argument quality (strong or weak argument) manipulation

Argument quality was manipulated between strong or weak argument (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979). The strong argument version of the message was presented with more
affirmative voices, such as “must,” “should,” and “have to,” and with more statistical
supporting evidences, such as research results and survey data. The weak argument
version of the message presented with less affirmative voices, such as “might,” “could,”
and “consider,” and quotes from other people without statistical supporting evidence,
such as “my friends said…” and “people said…”

Attitude toward information and author’s credibility scale

During the experiment, participants read their assigned stimulus article depending
on which condition they were randomly assigned. After reading, participants rated the
degree of their agreement about the given information. The scale of responses was a 10point Likert. Participants answered four questions asking their attitude about the given
article’s information adapted from Petty and Cacioppo (1979) as a reliable scale
(Chronbach’s alpha of .88):
1) I agree with this information
2) This information makes sense to me
3) I accept the story of this information
4) I think this information is a good solution

20

In addition participants answered four questions asking about the author’s
credibility for the given article’s information adapted from Petty and Cacioppo (1979) as
a reliable scale (Chronbach’s alpha of .92).
1) I think the author is trustworthy
2) I think the author is credible
3) I think the author won’t lie to me
4) I think the author won’t deceive someone

21

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

MANOVA analysis

The purpose of Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was completed in
order to assess the main and interaction effects of the heuristic cue, involvement, and
argument quality on attitude toward information and author’s credibility. Table 2
describes descriptive data for these control variables. Total number of case was 232;
however, 2 cases were not included because of missing values. Online news (M = 7.21,
SD = 1.87, Chronbach’s alpha of .88) and Facebook preference (M = 4.93, SD = 2.41,
Chronbach’s alpha of .90), broadcasting TV watching hours (M = 2.03, SD = 1.90),
social networking use per day (M = 4.25, SD = 2.78), level of college education (M =
2.80, SD = 1.18), and experiment duration was controlled. The level of college education
is an ordinal variable, but this variable is treated as a numerical variable by this study.
This analysis excludes answers for the “other” category as the level of college education.
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Table 2.
Descriptive statistics for control variables

Online news preference

M

SD

Number of
items

Chronbach’s
alpha

7.21

1.87

4

.88

4

.90

I like Online news postings
I’m comfortable with reading Online news postings
I think Online news postings are useful
I think Online news postings are credible
Facebook news preference

4.93

2.41

I like Facebook postings
I’m comfortable with reading Facebook postings
I think Facebook postings are useful
I think Facebook postings are credible
Broadcasting TV watching hours

2.03

1.90

1

On an average day, how many hours do you watch TV shows?
: including network cable, public broadcasting, but not streaming and download.

Social networking use per day

4.25

2.78

1

On an average day, how many news stories do you read from SNS such as
Facebook, Twitter, Google +, and Pinterest?
: include all screens—desktop, laptop, iPad, smartphone,etc.

Level of college education

2.80

1.18

1

What year are you at CSU?
1 Freshman, 2 Sophomore, 3 Junior, 4 Senior 5. Graduate student 6. Other*

Experiment duration (minute)

11:37
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5.31

1

MANOVA was required for this study because attitude toward information and
author’s credibility were significantly correlated (r = .65, p ≤ .001). Therefore, this study
was able to analyze both main effects and interaction effects on attitude toward
information and author’s credibility.
As shown in Table 3, the analysis results show significant main effects of
involvement [Pillai’s Trace: F (2, 215) = 4.17, p ≤ .05, η2 = .037] and significant
interaction effects among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument quality [Pillai’s Trace:
F (2, 215) =4.55, p ≤. 05, η2 = .041) on both attitude toward information and author’s
credibility. Box’s M test of equality of covariance matrices was significant (p ≤.01),
therefore this result confirms the homogeneity of the variance across all individual
experimental groups. In addition, the robustness of this analysis is solid because
assigning participants to each condition is not related with any other manipulation
procedures or experiment orders. That is because the online survey software equalized
the number of the sample to each condition automatically.
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Table 3.
Multivariate test for MANOVA: Pillai’s Trace

Value

F-value

P-value

Partial eta
squared

Power

Heuristic cue

0.00

0.51

0.60

.005

0.13

Involvement

0.04

4.17

0.02*

.037

0.73

Argument Quality

0.01

0.82

0.44

.018

0.19

Heuristic cue ×
Involvement
×Argument Quality

0.04

4.55

0.01*

.041

0.77

* Correlation between attitude toward information and author’s credibility was .65 (p ≤ .001)

ANOVA analysis

In an inspection of ANOVAs for the attitude toward information and author’s
credibility separately, individual post hoc test from the MANOVA was analyzed.
Regarding the attitude toward information, there is one main effect and one
interaction effect. First, involvement has a significant main effect on attitude toward
information [F (1, 216) = 7.18, p ≤. 01], and explains 3.2% of total variance of attitude
toward information. The attitude toward information of a high-involvement product (M =
7.19, SD = 1.74) was significantly more positive than of a low-involvement product (M =
6.56, SD = 2.03).
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Second, there was a significant interaction effect among heuristic cue,
involvement, and argument quality [F (1, 216) = 9.12, p ≤ .01] and this explains 4.0% of
total variance of attitude toward information.
Regarding author’s credibility, there is only an interaction effect and the main
effects were not significant. There was a significant interaction effect among heuristic
cue, involvement, and argument quality [F (1, 216) = 3.94, p ≤ .05], and it explains 1.8%
of total variance of the author’s credibility.
An ANOVA analysis reports significant interaction effects among heuristic cue,
involvement, and argument quality on both the attitude toward information and the
author’s credibility. These results support Hypothesis 1 and 2. The interaction effects on
both attitude toward information and the author’s credibility supports Hypothesis 1a and
1b when the argument quality is strong, and Hypothesis 2a and 2b when the heuristic cue
is low. Table 4 summarizes the analysis data that support these hypotheses.
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Table 4.
Hypothesis and their results

Hypothesis

Attitudes

ANOVA results

Attitude toward
information

Table 5 and Figure 7

Effects of the heuristic cue predicted by HSM

1a

1b

The heuristic cue effect is stronger for a lowinvolvement product compared to a highinvolvement product.

Author’s
credibility

Attitude toward
information

When the heuristic cue effect is high, the
positive attitude about the message will also
be high

Author’s
credibility

Table 6 and Figure 8

Table 5 and Figure 7

Table 6 and Figure 8

Effects of the argument quality predicted by ELM

2a

2b

The argument quality effect is stronger for a
high-involvement product compared to a lowinvolvement product.

Attitude toward
information

Author’s
credibility

Attitude toward
information

When the argument quality effect is high, the
positive attitude about the message will also
be high.

Author’s
credibility
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Table 7 and Figure 9

Table 8 and Figure 10

Table 7 and Figure 9

Table 8 and Figure 10

Hypothesis 1

Both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis report significant interaction effects
among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument quality on both the attitude toward
information and the author’s credibility. These significant interaction effects support
Hypothesis 1 when the argument quality is strong.
First, Hypothesis 1 is supported by both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis,
showing significant interaction effects among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument
quality on the attitude toward information.

Table 5.
Attitude toward information of each condition when the argument quality is strong

M

Sample size

SD

Heuristic
cue

High
involvement

Low
involvement

High

7.01

Low

7.54

High

High

involvement

Low
involvement

involvement

Low
involvement

7.13

2.04

1.69

37

28

6.19

1.42

2.30

24
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Hypothesis 1a predicted that the heuristic cue effect is stronger for a lowinvolvement product compared to a high-involvement product. As shown in Table 5,
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ANOVA analysis shows that when argument quality is strong the heuristic cue increases
the attitude toward information more positively (+ 0.94) when the information is about a
low-involvement product. On the other hand, the heuristic cue decreased attitude toward
information more negatively (- 0.53) when the information was about a high-involvement
product. Figure 7 demonstrates these relationships that when the argument quality is
strong, the heuristic cue effect is stronger for a low-involvement product compared to a
high-involvement product (Hypothesis 1a), and when the heuristic cue effect is high, the
positive attitude about the message will also be high (Hypothesis 1b).

Figure 7.
The interaction effect on the attitude toward information under the strong
argument quality
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In addition, Hypothesis 1b predicted that when the heuristic cue effect is high, the
positive attitude about the message will also be high. ANOVA analysis shows that the
information presented with the high heuristic cue (M = 7.13, SD = 1.69) induces more
positive attitudes toward information than the information presented with the low
heuristic cue (M = 6.19, SD = 2.30) when the information was about a low-involvement
product.
Second, Hypothesis 1 is also supported by both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis,
reporting significant interaction effects among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument
quality on the author’s credibility.

Table 6.
Author’s credibility of each condition when the argument quality is strong

M

Sample size

SD

Heuristic
cue

High
involvement

Low
involvement

High

5.81

Low

6.38

High

High

involvement

Low
involvement

involvement

Low
involvement

6.24

1.93

1.96

37

28

5.41

2.05

2.40

24
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Hypothesis 1a predicted that the heuristic cue effect is stronger for a lowinvolvement product compared to a high-involvement product. As shown in Table 6,
ANOVA analysis shows that when argument quality is strong the heuristic cue increases,
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the heuristic cue increases (+ 0.83) the author’s credibility of the information when the
information is about a low-involvement product. On the other hand, the heuristic cue
decreased (- 0.57) the author’s credibility of the information when the information was
about a high-involvement product with strong argument quality. Figure 8 demonstrates
these relationships; when the argument quality is strong, the heuristic cue effect is
stronger for a low-involvement product compared to a high-involvement product
(Hypothesis 1a), and when the heuristic cue effect is high, the author’s credibility of the
message will also be high (Hypothesis 1b).

Figure 8.
The interaction effect on the author’s credibility under the strong argument quality
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In addition, Hypothesis 1b predicted that when the heuristic cue effect is high, the
positive attitude about the message will also be high. As shown in Table 5, ANOVA
analysis shows that the information presented with the high heuristic cue (M = 6.24, SD =
1.96) induce more positive author’s credibility than the information presented with the
low heuristic cue (M = 5.41, SD = 2.40) when the information was about a lowinvolvement product.
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Hypothesis 2

Both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis report significant interaction effects
among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument quality on both the attitude toward
information and the author’s credibility. These significant interaction effects support
Hypothesis 2 when the heuristic cue is low.
First, Hypothesis 2 is supported by both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis,
reporting significant interaction effects among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument
quality on the attitude toward information.

Table 7.
Attitude toward information of each condition when the heuristic cue is low

M

Sample size

SD

Argument
quality

High
involvement

Low
involvement

Strong

7.54

Weak

6.90

High

High

involvement

Low
involvement

involvement

Low
involvement

6.19

1.42

2.30

24

28

6.70

1.75

2.40

28

24

Hypothesis 2a predicted that the argument quality effect is stronger for a highinvolvement product compared to a low-involvement product. As shown in Table 7,
ANOVA analysis shows that when the heuristic cue is low, the strong argument quality
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increases the attitude toward information more positively (+ 0.64) when the information
is about a high-involvement product. On the other hand, the strong argument decreases
the attitude toward information more negatively (- 0.51) when the information was about
a low-involvement product. Figure 9 demonstrates these relationships that when the
heuristic cue is low, the argument quality effect is stronger for a high-involvement
product compared to a low-involvement product (Hypothesis 2a), and when the argument
quality effect is high, the positive attitude about the message will also be high
(Hypothesis 2b).

Figure 9.
The interaction effect on the attitude toward information under the low heuristic
cue condition
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In addition, Hypothesis 2b predicted that when the argument quality effect is high,
the positive attitude about the message will also be high. ANOVA analysis shows that the
information presented with the strong argument quality (M = 7.54, SD = 1.42) induces
more positive attitudes toward information than the information presented with the weak
argument quality (M = 6.90, SD = 1.75) when the information was about a highinvolvement product.

Second, Hypothesis 2 is supported by both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis,
reporting significant interaction effects among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument
quality on the author’s credibility.

Table 8.
Author’s credibility of each condition when the heuristic cue is low

M

Sample size

SD

Argument
quality

High
involvement

Low
involvement

Strong

6.38

Weak

5.52

High

High

involvement

Low
involvement

involvement

Low
involvement

5.41

2.05

2.40

24

28

5.60

1.97

2.12

28

24

35

Hypothesis 2a predicted that the argument quality effect is stronger for a highinvolvement product compared to a low-involvement product. As shown in Table 8,
ANOVA analysis shows that when the heuristic cue is low, the strong argument quality
increases (+ 0.86) the author’s credibility of information when the information is about a
high-involvement product. On the other hand, the strong argument decreases (- 0.19) the
author’s credibility of information when the information was about a low-involvement
product. Figure 10 demonstrates these relationships that when the heuristic cue is low, the
argument quality effect is stronger for a high-involvement product compared to a lowinvolvement product (Hypothesis 2a), and when the argument quality effect is high, the
author’s credibility of message will also be high (Hypothesis 2b).

Figure 10.
The interaction effect on the author’s credibility under the low heuristic cue
condition
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In addition, Hypothesis 2b predicted that when the argument quality effect is high,
the author’s credibility of the message will also be high. ANOVA analysis shows that the
information presented with the strong argument quality (M = 6.38, SD = 2.05) induces
author’s credibility of information more positively than the information presented with
the weak argument quality (M = 5.52, SD = 1.97) when the information was about a highinvolvement product.
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Summary of analysis results

According to the results of both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis, this study
found significant interaction effects among heuristic cue, involvement, and argument
quality on both the attitude toward information and the author’s credibility. These
significant interaction effects support Hypothesis 1 when the argument quality is strong;
and Hypothesis 2 when the heuristic cue is low. Table 9 summarizes both Hypotheses
and their findings.

Table 9.
Hypothesis and their results

Hypothesis

MANOVA results

ANOVA results

Effects of the heuristic cue predicted by HSM

1a

1b

The heuristic cue effect is stronger for a lowinvolvement product compared to a high-involvement
product.
When the heuristic cue effect is high, the positive
attitude about the message will also be high

Supported
Supported
when argument
quality is strong

for both the attitude
toward information
and the author’s
credibility

Effects of the argument quality predicted by ELM

2a

The argument quality effect is stronger for a highinvolvement product compared to a low-involvement
product.

Supported
Supported
when heuristic
cue is low

2b

When the argument quality effect is high, the positive
attitude about the message will also be high.
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for both the attitude
toward information
and the author’s
credibility

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

This paper is designed to explore how online readers process information when
online news articles present majority cues. These majority cues are considered a specific
type of heuristic cue and this study discovered complex interaction effects of these
heuristic cues. HSM and ELM successfully predict how these interaction effects work
when these models work together. This is because the emphasized points of both
predictions are slightly different. HSM (Chaiken, 1980) emphasizes the effects of noncontent cues when people process information along a peripheral path because humans
are cognitive misers. Meanwhile, ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) emphasizes the effects
of content quality when people process information along a central path because people
can elaborate more on the given information. Motivation and involvement are the
common keys to determine whether people process information along peripheral or
central paths.
The assumptions and predictions of both HSM and ELM are supported by this
study in a different and more integrated way. Additionally, this study’s results conclude
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that people are cognitive misers when they face heavy cognitive loads; until that point
they elaborate information easily. In other words, people try to spend their cognitive
resources more efficiently.
First, Hypothesis 1 states that the heuristic cue effect is stronger for a lowinvolvement product compared to a high-involvement product, which was supported by
both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis. Analysis results also confirm the HSM’s
predictions when the argument quality of given information is strong. Specifically,
heuristic cues increase the attitudes of participants, both attitude toward information and
author’s credibility, more positively when the information is about a low-involvement
product, but the heuristic cues decrease the attitudes of participants more negatively when
the information was about a high-involvement product. HSM explains that this is because
people are cognitive misers. According to HSM, people just adopt heuristic cues when
they do not have motivation to use their cognitive resources to minimize their cognitive
load, whereas people ignore heuristic cues when they do have motivations to use their
cognitive resources to understand given information. This is supported only under the
condition when the argument quality is strong.
Second, Hypothesis 2 states that the argument quality effects are stronger for a
high-involvement product compared to a low-involvement product, which was supported
by both MANOVA and ANOVA analysis. Analysis results also confirm ELM’s
predictions, when the heuristic cue is low. Specifically, the strong argument quality
increases the attitude toward information more positively when the information is about a
high-involvement product. On the other hand, the strong argument decreases the attitude
toward information more negatively when the information was about a low-involvement
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product. ELM explains that this is because people elaborate information differently based
on their involvement. According to ELM, people elaborate given information more when
they are highly involved in subjects; therefore, they process the information through
central paths. People do not elaborate given information when they are not involved in
subjects; therefore, they process the information through peripheral paths. These
explanations are supported only under the condition when the heuristic cue is low.
Third, this study suggests additional explanations as to why HSM’s and ELM’s
predictions are supported only in certain conditions. HSM is supported only under the
condition when the argument quality is strong, and ELM is supported only under the
condition when the heuristic cue is low. The results of this study suggest that people also
can rely on heuristic cues when they are highly involved in the subjects; and people also
do not need to elaborate argument quality when they are highly involved in the subjects.
These results are counterparts of both HSM’s and ELM’s predictions. This study suggests
both models to have additional parts, which are cognitive efficiency (Lo Storto, 2013;
Rypma et al., 2006) and cognitive threshold to explain the results that both HSM and
ELM does not account for.
Cognitive efficiency is generally defined as a degree of qualitative increases in
acquired knowledge compared to the invested cognitive efforts (Hoffman, 2012). This
concept is similar to the degree of the amount of reduced uncertainty or complexity of
information per required cognitive resources. For example, if we could understand
qualities of information without serious consideration and thinking, then it is considered
cognitively efficient. The Cognitive threshold is the point of divide between efficiency
and inefficiency. For example, when given information requires only a little amount of
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cognitive resources that is below the cognitive threshold, people can understand
information efficiently; however, when the given information requires a larger amount of
cognitive resources that exceed the cognitive threshold, people cannot understand
information efficiently. This study suggests that the HSM and ELM are supported only
when the required amount of cognitive resources is below the cognitive threshold and
when people can process information efficiently. On the other hand, when the given
information requires a larger amount of cognitive resources that exceeds the cognitive
threshold and when people cannot understand information efficiently, then HSM and
ELM fail to explain why people process messages differently. Figure 11 displays how
cognitive thresholds divide cognitive efficiency between the efficient area and inefficient
area.

Figure 11.
Cognitive thresholds and efficiency
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One reason why people may process differently when using cognitive efficiency
is that individuals moderate their information processing in more efficient ways for them
to achieve a Maximization of Cognitive Efficiency (MCE). This theory is similar with
ecological approaches, which are represented by the concept of affordances (Gibson,
1977; Good, 2007; Withagen & Chemero, 2011). Gibson and Walker (1984) defined
affordances as relative properties of the environment taken to observers; therefore, when
people perceive the utility of given information for appropriate actions, then they detect
the affordance.
Similar to Gibson’s and Walker’s (1984) affordances, MCE explains that when
people are involved in topics of given information they spend their cognitive resources to
elaborate the information until the point when they can process efficiently. Meanwhile,
when people need to spend more cognitive resources than their cognitive thresholds, then
they choose to rely on more efficient processes such as heuristic cues. Furthermore, if
they have to spend cognitive resources far exceeding their thresholds, they might choose
to abandon processing the information. There are differences between Gibson and Walker
(1984) affordances and MCE. First, people moderate their message processing based on
their motivations and involvements, which are applied from HSM and ELM. Second, the
roles of action that affordances have do not apply to MCE. Therefore, when comparing
affordances that explain the interaction between individuals and the environment, MCE
explains more specifically about knowledge acquisition processes.
Once we apply cognitive thresholds and MCE, the current study can explain the
counterparts of HSM and ELM as well as their original predictions. Before explaining
counterparts, HSM and ELM’s predictions are applied when people have supporting
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materials that can be efficiently processed. First, HSM predicts that people save their
cognitive resources and rely more on heuristic cues when they are not involved in the
messages. This is because people tend to choose more efficient cognitive processes when
they have less involvement, compared to when they are highly involved in subjects.
Heuristic cues are more efficient than elaboration when they are not involved in the
information, although heuristic cues may be less accurate than elaboration. Therefore,
people rely on heuristic cues to process information when they are less involved in the
messages.
Second, ELM predicts that people elaborate information more when they are
highly involved. When individuals have supporting materials that they can easily
elaborate and are highly involved in the given information, they are willing to elaborate
supporting materials within their cognitive thresholds. This is a circumstance when
people can process information efficiently; and therefore, they determine their attitudes
based on available supporting materials, such as argument quality, and minimize the
effects of heuristic cues. This is because elaboration is more efficient to reduce
inaccuracy that heuristic cues have. Determining argument quality can reduce uncertainty
efficiently and without exceeding the cognitive threshold.
The uniqueness of this study is the additional results that HSM and ELM could
not account for, especially when there are no supporting materials that people can
efficiently process. When people cannot find easily accessible supporting materials, they
start to adopt heuristic cues as their supporting materials, and HSM and ELM fail to
explain this. First, when people face a huge uncertainty that requires excessive cognitive
resources, they rely on heuristic cues even if they are highly involved in the information,
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which is not explained by ELM. Increased uncertainty makes people use more cognitive
resources beyond their cognitive thresholds to process the message properly; this is
inefficient. When the information requires an excessive cognitive load that exceeds their
cognitive thresholds, people rely on heuristic cues to avoid cognitive inefficiency that
comes from numerous uncertainties and complexities, even if they are highly involved in
the given subjects.
Second, people consider the heuristic cues as irrelevant information for the lowinvolvement products, which is not explained by HSM, when people could not find easily
accessible supporting materials. This is because people do not want to spend their
cognitive resources inefficiently even if it is a very small amount, such as heuristic cues,
when they face a huge uncertainty for the low-involvement subjects. Likewise, when
people are highly involved in subjects, they spend more cognitive effort to adopt heuristic
cues because that is more efficient than elaborating huge uncertainties and complexities.
In summary, the explanations of both HSM and ELM are supported only when
people use their cognitive resources below the limit of cognitive thresholds, and MCE
explains when people need to use cognitive resources above their cognitive thresholds. At
first, people start to adopt heuristic cues to reduce cognitive load even when they are
highly involved in the subjects. Next, people start to ignore heuristic cues when they are
not involved in subjects. Additionally, this study further finds that people also can ignore
heuristic cues when they are highly involved in subjects and when they have to spend
cognitive resources far much exceeding their threshold. That is because humans are
naturally moderating their information processing in a dynamic manner that maximizes
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their cognitive efficiency to interpret the given information and environment efficiently
and in a timely manner.

Limitations and future research

There are some limitations to this thesis that encourage future research projects.
Although this study replicated well known assumptions of HSM and ELM, the results of
this study support their predictions under only certain conditions. This study tried to
provide explanations of why their predictions cannot account for certain circumstances in
regard to MCE; however, the assumptions and explanations of MCE need more empirical
support with future research. Additional research employing various methods, contexts,
and fields are required to support this theory.
First, the effects of heuristic cues are highly dependent upon an individual’s
cognitive ability and environment. In other words, participants’ demographics and
experimental environments may play important roles. For example, the effects of
heuristic cues may be different between age groups and education, between lab
experiments and take home surveys, between paper print and computer screen, and
between smaller and larger screens. This is because people perceive heuristic cues and
affordances as relative properties of the environment taken to observers (Gibson &
Walker, 1984). Therefore, future studies should examine how heuristic cues have
different effects depending on demographics and the experimental environment.
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Second, the effects of heuristic cues are also highly variable depending upon
participants’ involvement. The participants of this study are only selected from college
students and it uses limited subjects; however, in reality, there are various issues in which
people have different involvement levels. Studies that explore various topics, issues, and
public opinions will have benefits when they incorporate the results of this study. For
example, this study can guide the effects of heuristic cues in regard to online health
communication, political communication, organizational communication, advertising,
public relations, and social media. This study’s results can guide future studies to
discover the unique effects of online communication that have interactive features.
Third, future studies could explore the different types of heuristic cues on online
media. This study examines only one specific type of heuristic cue, which is the majority
cue; however, there are undiscovered heuristic cues in regard to individual’s emotions,
and social norms. For example, certain stories and pictures can create certain types of
emotional heuristic cues (Horowitz & Wanstrom, 2008), and certain other replies or
content can create certain types of heuristic cues that are based on social norms and
political socialization (Horowitz & Wanstrom, 2006).
Fourth, more specific in-depth studies that examine cognitive efficiency and
thresholds of individuals, and studies that examine different efficiencies among different
media, would be welcome. For example, cognitive efficiencies and thresholds of
individuals can be different when they process information from different media types,
such as different channel richness (Bracken, Jeffres, & Neuendorf, 2004) and presence
(Bracken & Skalski, 2009), or different media forms and presence (Bracken, 2006). In
these examples, it is predicted that when people process messages with different media
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types, the difference of individuals’ level of presence can change their cognitive
efficiencies and thresholds that influence the effects of heuristic cues and information
processing.
Finally, future research inquiries will be encouraged to integrate the effects of
heuristic cues both with an individual’s cognitive ability and with the participants’
involvements for various subjects in various environments, and with the different media
types and presence. These studies will help us to understand the complex nature of
information processing, and unveil the interactive effects of online media.

Implications and conclusions

This paper presents that HSM and ELM are supported when people use their
cognitive resources efficiently. On the other hand, these predictions are not supported
when people need to use cognitive resources inefficiently. MCE explains that this is
because humans naturally moderate their information processing in a dynamic manner
that maximizes their cognitive efficiency to interpret the given information and
environment efficiently and in a timely manner. Therefore, when people can process
given information efficiently they tend to ignore heuristic cues as predicted by HSM and
ELM. Meanwhile, when people cannot process given information efficiently due to the
increased amount of uncertainty that exceed cognitive thresholds, people start to adopt
heuristic cues to reduce cognitive load although they are highly involved in the subjects
of given information. Additionally, this study further suggests that people can also ignore
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heuristic cues and argument quality, and just give up to process the given information
when they have to spend cognitive resources far exceeding their threshold although they
are highly involved in the subjects of given information.
For example, in public healthcare issues, there are tons of arguments,
advertisements, and information about healthcare and MCE can explain individuals’
different information processing. First, for people who think those healthcare issues are
important for themselves and their family, strong argument quality is likely more
important than heuristic cues when the argument quality is efficiently processed and
elaborated by individuals. On the other hand, when individuals cannot process the
argument quality easily, such as when the given information is too long or complex to
read and understand, they will likely try to elaborate this information until the point of
their cognitive thresholds. Once the required cognitive resources exceed their cognitive
threshold, people will likely start to rely on heuristic cues even if they are highly involved
in the healthcare issues.
Therefore, public campaigns or arguments about healthcare issues should be
presented with an appropriate amount and complexity of supporting materials; however,
if it is hard to adjust the argument to have the right amount and complexity of
information, then try to make the issue very complex and hard to understand and rely on
heuristic cues. Usually, healthcare issues are very complicated and they require too much
time to understand and to consider every single aspect of the issues. Additionally, there
are too many controversial arguments on the Internet. As a result, many people have no
other choices other than to rely on heuristic cues such as friends’ recommendations,
majority cues, and their political party’s stances. Furthermore, if the issues are always
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complex and hard to understand, then it is possible that people will abandon
understanding given information at all. It is common to see people who do not stand for
any side of arguments and avoid discussing healthcare issues. This is a problem that HSM
and ELM cannot account for.
Second, for most people who think that healthcare issues are not important for
them, heuristic cues attached to given information such as majority cues may increase the
persuasiveness of the given information. Additionally, in order for these heuristic cues to
work properly, the given information about healthcare issues should include any kind of
supporting materials that people can easily understand, such as good argument quality. If
the given information does not include any of these supporting materials that people can
efficiently process, individuals will consider these heuristic cues as irrelevant
information.
Therefore, MCE predicts that heuristic cues are a very efficient way to change
individuals’ attitudes; however, in order to make these cues work properly,
communicators should consider conditions when they will take effect, such as the
individuals’ involvement, cognitive thresholds, and complexity of information and
problems. It is good to know that people have a mechanism that maximizes their limited
cognitive resources, because this will help to make better communication strategies for
online-communicators.
In addition, this paper carefully casts a warning that the effects of heuristic cues
on socially unacceptable contents can also influence people’s attitude, such as content
and posts that including highly sensational texts and images. In order to get an
individual’s interest and attention, this content is often weaponized with sexuality,
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racialism, and violence. This content tends to get people’s attentions relatively easily.
Furthermore, the advertisement market values our attention to this content. People may
consider that this content is just for fun and has nothing to do with the real world;
however, inconsiderate attention for this content may influence both the individuals who
create this content and those who see this content later. This is because the creators of this
sensational content may try more extreme sensational material and exposure of such
content may lead viewers to want more extreme content. In these circumstances, the
effects of heuristic cues on those contents may make people more accepting and
insensitive to those socially unacceptable contents. Therefore, we need to be careful when
we express our interests. This is the time that we have to carefully select what we will
click.

51

REFERENCES

Bracken, C. C. (2006). Perceived source credibility of local television news: The impact
of television form and presence. Journal of broadcasting & electronic media,
50(4), 723-741.
Bracken, C. C., Jeffres, L. W., & Neuendorf, K. A. (2004). Criticism or praise? The
impact of verbal versus text-only computer feedback on social presence, intrinsic
motivation, and recall. Cyberpsychology & behavior, 7(3), 349-357.
Bracken, C. C., & Skalski, P. (2009). Immersed in media: Telepresence in everyday life:
Routledge.
Bucy, E. P. (2004). Second generation net news: Interactivity and information
accessibility in the online environment. International journal on media
management, 6(1-2), 102-113.
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of
source versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of personality and social
psychology, 39(5), 752-766. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.39.5.752
Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1989). Heuristic and systematic information processing
within and. Unintended thought, 212.
Chaiken, S., & Ledgerwood, A. (2011). A theory of heuristic and systematic information
processing. Handbook of theories of social psychology: Volume one, 246-166.
52

Edwards, A., & Edwards, C. (2013). Computer-mediated word-of-mouth communication:
The influence of mixed reviews on student perceptions of instructors and courses.
Communication education, 62(4), 412-424.
Eysenbach, G. (2008). Credibility of health information and digital media: New
perspectives and implications for youth. Digital media, youth, and credibility,
123-154.
Faraji-Rad, A., Samuelsen, B. M., & Warlop, L. (2012). Similar advisers are more
persuasive when advice-takers rely on their feelings. FEB Research report
MO_1202.
Freeman, K. S., & Spyridakis, J. H. (2004). An examination of factors that affect the
credibility of online health information. Technical communication, 51(2), 239263.
Gibson, E. J. (1977). The concept of affordances. Perceiving, acting, and knowing, 6782.
Gibson, E. J., & Walker, A. S. (1984). Development of knowledge of visual-tactual
affordances

of

substance.

[Research

Support,

Non-U.S.

Gov't].

Child

development, 55(2), 453-460.
Gigerenzer, G. (2008). Rationality for mortals: How people cope with uncertainty:
Oxford University Press.

53

Gigerenzer, G. (2010). Moral satisficing: Rethinking moral behavior as bounded
rationality. Topics in cognitive science, 2(3), 528-554.
Good, J. M. M. (2007). The affordances for social psychology of the ecological approach
to

social

knowing.

Theory

&

psychology,

17(2),

265-295.

doi:

10.1177/0959354307075046
Guimond, L. A. (1997). An experimental investigation of the consumer perception of
products featured on coupons. Concordia University.
Hoffman, B. (2012). Cognitive efficiency: A conceptual and methodological comparison.
Learning and Instruction, 22(2), 133-144.
Horowitz, E. M., & Wanstrom, J. (2006). Patriotism and political socialization: Young
adults' perspectives on the first anniversary of 9/11. Language, symbols, and the
media: communication in the aftermath of the world trade center attack, 129.
Horowitz, E. M., & Wanstrom, J. (2008). Young adults'media use, emotional reactions,
and judgments about terrorism. Terrorism: communication and rhetorical
perspectives, 359.
Hunt, K. A., Keaveney, S. M., & Lee, M. (1995). Involvement, attributions, and
consumer responses to rebates. Journal of business and psychology, 9(3), 273297.
Jo, S. (2005). The effect of online media credibility on trust relationships. Journal of
website promotion, 1(2), 57-78.

54

Lo Storto, C. (2013). Evaluating ecommerce websites cognitive efficiency: An
integrative framework based on data envelopment analysis. Applied ergonomics,
44(6), 1004-1014.
Massey, B. L., & Levy, M. R. (1999). Interactivity, online journalism, and englishlanguage web newspapers in asia. Journalism & mass communication quarterly,
76(1), 138-151. doi: 10.1177/107769909907600110
Pallak, S. R. (1983). Salience of a communicator's physical attractiveness and persuasion:
A heuristic versus systematic processing interpretation. Social Cognition, 2(2),
158-170. doi: 10.1521/soco.1983.2.2.158
Perloff, R. M. (2012). The dynamics of persuasion: Communication and attitudes in the
twenty-first century: Routledge.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1979). Issue involvement can increase or decrease
persuasion by enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses. Journal of
personality and social psychology, 37(10), 1915-1926.
Rypma, B., Berger, J. S., Prabhakaran, V., Martin Bly, B., Kimberg, D. Y., Biswal, B. B.,
& D'Esposito, M. (2006). Neural correlates of cognitive efficiency. Neuroimage,
33(3), 969-979.
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological
review, 63(2), 129.

55

Sundar, S. S., & Nass, C. (2001). Conceptualizing sources in online news. Journal of
communication, 51(1), 52-72. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2001.tb02872.x
Tewksbury, D. (2003). What do americans really want to know? Tracking the behavior of
news readers on the internet. Journal of communication, 53(4), 694-710. doi:
10.1111/j.1460-2466.2003.tb02918.x
Thurman, N. J. (2008). Forums for citizen journalists? Adoption of user generated
content initiatives by online news media. New media & society, 10(1), 139-157.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
science, 185(4157), 1124-1131.
Van der Wurff, R. (2005). Impacts of the internet on newspapers in europe: Conclusions.
Gazette, 67(1), 107-120. doi: 10.1177/0016549205049181
Withagen, R., & Chemero, A. (2011). Affordances and classification: On the significance
of a sidebar in james gibson's last book. Philosophical psychology, 25(4), 521537. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.579424
Wu, B. T. W., Crocker, K. E., & Rogers, M. (1989). Humor and comparatives in ads for
high- and low-involvement products. [Article]. Journalism Quarterly, 66(3), 653780.

56

57

APPENDICES

58

A. Manipulation items

1. High involvement
1.1 High involvement, strong argument, high heuristic cue

59

1.2 High involvement, strong argument, low heuristic cue

60

1.3 High involvement, weak argument, high heuristic cue

61

1.4 High involvement, weak argument, low heuristic cue

62

2. low involvement
2.1 low involvement, strong argument, High heuristic cue

63

2.2 low involvement, strong argument, Low heuristic cue

64

2.3 low involvement, weak argument, High heuristic cue

65

2.4 low involvement, weak argument, Low heuristic cue

66

B. Consent form

Informed Consent Form

Communication and Understanding
A project conducted under the auspices of Cleveland State University
School of Communication
Principal Investigators: Dr. Edward Horowitz and Hocheol Yang
This study will look at how individuals think about the information that they see and
read. We are interested in how some people think about what they see posted on a
website. This research will hopefully result in better understanding of the thinking and
reactions people have.
In this study, you will be asked to read an online post and then answer some questions
about your reaction to this post and your attitudes to events in the news. In total, your
participation will take about 30 minutes. While this should be an interesting task to
complete, there will be no immediate benefits or risks from your participation.
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and your answers will remain
confidential. Although answering every question is preferable, you have the right to skip
any question that you do not want to answer. You also have the right to stop participating
at any time prior to the completion of the project without any consequence whatsoever.
Your name will never be identified with any of the study materials. We may use the
results of this investigation in later research; however, no identifying information will be
available. Published results of this study will contain no information linking you to this
study.
If you have any questions about this research or the questionnaire, you may contact Dr.
Edward Horowitz at (216) 687-4511 or Hocheol Yang (570) 500-0015.
You must be at least 18 years old to participate in this research.
Thank you for your participation and help.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------□ I hereby agree to participate in the above-described research. I understand my
participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without penalty.
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C. Survey questions
A1~5. Attitude toward argument, Likert (1~10).
A1. I agree with this information.
A2. This information makes sense to me.
A3. I accept the story of this information.
A4. I think this information is a good solution.
B1~4. Author’s credility , Likert (1~10).
B1. I think the author is trustworthy
B2. I think the author is credible
B3. I think the author won’t be lie to me
B4. I think the author won’t deceive someone
C1~4. Intention, Likert (1~10).
C1. I will share this article using my SNS (Examples: Facebook, Twitter, and Google +)
C2. During talking with friends and family in person, I will share this article's idea to them.
C3. I will join online community sites to express my support of this article (Example: Slicksdeal)
C4. I will post an article on my blog to support this article's idea.
D1~4. Involvement: manipulation check, Likert (1~10).
D1. The article’s information is very important to me
D2. About the information of the article, it’s not a big deal if you make a mistake
D3. About the information of the article, it’s hard to make a bad choice
D4. You can really tell about the quality of the product, which is discussed in the article.
D5. When purchasing the product that discussed in this article, how important is the brand or
company?
E1~4. Argument quality: manipulation check (Petty, Cacioppo, and Schamann 1983), Likert
(1~10).
E1. In your opinion, how believable is this information to you?
E2. In your opinion, how convincing is this information to you?
E3. In your opinion, how sound is this information to you?
E4. In your opinion, how strong is this information to you?
F1~4. Heuristic cue manipulation check, Likert (1~10).
F1. I think many people agree with this information
F2. I think many people liked this information
F3. I think many people showed their support for this information
F4. I think many people supported about the information of this article
G. demographics
Please tell us a little about yourself.
a. Gender? □ 1 Male □ 2 Female
b. Your age on your last birthday: _____
c. What year are you at CSU?
1 Feshamn, 2 Sophomeo, 3 Juior, 4 Senior
d. Race: 1. white, 2. Black or African American, 3. American Indian and Alaska Native, 4. Asian,
5. Native Hawaiian and other Islander, 6. None of the listed choices.
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D. Tables for ANOVA Analysis
Table 10.
ANOVA results predicting attitude toward information
M

SD

Heuristic cue

High

6.94

1.79

Low

6.81

2.06

Involvement

High

7.19

1.74

Low

6.56

2.03

Argument Quality

Strong

6.94

1.94

Weak

6.82

1.89

Heuristic cue × Involvement ×
Argument Quality

Error
Total

SS

df

MS

F

p

Power

3.02

1.00

3.02

0.99

0.32

0.17

22.01

1.00

22.01

7.18

0.008**

0.76

0.44

1.00

0.44

0.14

0.71

0.07

27.94

1.00

27.94

9.12

0.003**

0.85

661.89

216.00

11800.17

230.00
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Table 11.
ANOVA results predicting author’s credibility
M

SD

Heuristic cue

High

5.78

2.02

Low

5.71

2.15

Involvement

High

5.84

2.00

Low

5.65

2.15

Argument Quality

Strong

5.91

2.09

Weak

5.75

2.07

Heuristic cue × Involvement ×
Argument Quality

SS

df

MS

F

p

Power

0.80

1.00

0.80

0.20

0.65

0.07

2.43

1.00

2.43

0.62

0.43

0.12

5.67

1.00

5.67

1.44

0.23

0.22

15.52

1.00

15.52

3.94

0.049*

0.51

852.76

216.00

3.95

8615.42

230.00

Error

Total
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